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BROWNFIELDS AT 20:
A CRITICAL REEVALUATION
Joel B. Eisen*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The revitalization of brownfields,1 once a theory, is now an industry. This industry, however, is not yet mature. It has been only
twenty years since Congress attempted to give prospective purchasers of real estate a defense to liability under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(“CERCLA”),2 and a little more than a decade since the majority
of states began to embrace voluntary cleanup programs for abandoned or under-used sites.3 The ink is barely dry on the 2002
CERCLA amendment that promises to reduce the risk of federal
liability for brownfields developers.4
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. The author wishes
to thank Ron Rosenberg for his insights on brownfields law and policy, Bill Wolfe of
the New Jersey chapter of Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility
(“PEER”) for information about New Jersey’s brownfields programs, and Clay Burns
for invaluable research assistance.
1. New Jersey’s definition of a brownfield is “[a]ny former or current commercial
or industrial site that is currently vacant or underutilized and on which there has been,
or there is suspected to have been, a discharge of a contaminant.” N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 58:10B (West 2006).
2. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, & Liability Act
of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (2000); see also id. §§ 9601–9675; Susan Opp & Sarah
Hollis, Contaminated Properties: History, Regulations, and Resources for Community
Members, Univ. of Louisville Ctr. for Envtl. Pol’y & Mgmt., Practice Guide No. 9, at 6
(2005), http://cepm.louisville.edu/Pubs_WPapers/practiceguides/PG9.pdf (stating that
“SARA [the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act] added the innocent
landowner defense, which sought to ease the liability on people who had inherited or
purchased property without knowledge of potential contamination”).
3. See generally Joel B. Eisen, “Brownfields of Dreams?”: Challenges and Limits
of Voluntary Cleanup Programs and Incentives, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 883 [hereinafter
Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams]; Joel B. Eisen, Brownfields Policies for Sustainable Cities, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 187 (1999).
4. See Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act of
2002, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604-05, 9607, 9622, 9628 (2002); see also Seth Schofield, In Search
of the Institution in Institutional Controls: The Failure of the Small Business Liability
Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act of 2002 and the Need for Federal Legislation,
12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 946, 956 (2005) (claiming that the Act “may be helpful but . .
. is ultimately insufficient”); Fenton D. Strickland, Note, Brownfields Remediated?
How the Bona Fide Prospective Purchaser Exemption from CERCLA Liability and
the Windfall Lien Inhibit Brownfield Redevelopment, 38 IND. L. REV. 789, 804 (2005)
(criticizing the Act’s liability provision). For other criticisms of the Act, see William
T.D. Freeland, Environmental Justice and the Brownfields Revitalization Act of 2001:
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Even in these relatively early days, brownfields remediation and
reuse is almost universally viewed as a done deal—a major environmental success story.5 Many point to state cleanup programs
that have processed thousands of sites successfully, and there are
numerous high-profile stories of successful conversions of neglected sites to profitable reuse.6 Still, relatively little empirical
work has been done to assess whether state and federal
brownfields policies have been an unqualified success.7 Getting a
handle on their value requires, among other things, accounting for
the wide variety in state program features, the numbers of cases
handled, and the types and numbers of results. It also requires
looking longitudinally at a statistically significant sample of sites to
see whether environmental problems develop or persist after a period of years.
The optimism about brownfields policies has considerable staying power, in part because it rests on a foundation of specific expectations about brownfields, their cleanup and reuse, and
assumptions about the typical site and typical developer. These expectations relate to “the nature of brownfield properties; the expectations and behavior of public and private parties involved in
the development, environmental, and financial risks; the importance of subsidies; and the investment climate of host communities.”8 In this Article, I term this foundation the “brownfields
Brownfields of Dreams or a Nightmare in the Making?, 8 J. GENDER RACE & JUST.
183 (2004) (criticizing the Act on environmental justice grounds); Stanley A. Millan,
Contemporary CERCLA: Reversals of Fortune and Black Holes, 16 FORDHAM ENVTL.
L. REV. 183, 198 (2005) (noting that brownfields developers could face windfall liens).
5. See, e.g., Jennifer Felten, Brownfield Redevelopment 1995-2005: An Environmental Justice Success Story?, 40 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 679 (2006).
6. Kris Wernstedt et al., The Brownfields Phenomenon: Much Ado About Something or the Timing of the Shrewd? 4 (Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper 0446, 2004), available at http://www.rff.org/Documents/RFF-DP-04-46.pdf [hereinafter
Wernstedt et al., Brownfields Phenomenon] (noting that “[i]f one compares the state
of affairs vis-à-vis the redevelopment of brownfields today to that of 10 years ago, it is
clear that federal and state promotion of brownfields has yielded numerous success
stories of idled and underutilized contaminated properties that now house a variety of
economic activities”); see also infra note 54 and accompanying text (discussing success
stories in Rust Belt cities).
7. See David A. Dana, State Brownfields Programs as Laboratories of Democracy?, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 86, 86 (2005) (noting that “state brownfields programs
represent a lost opportunity—the opportunity to empirically test different approaches
to real property remediation”); Wernstedt et al., Brownfields Phenomenom, supra
note 6, at 4 (noting that “[t]he empirical literature on brownfields—a topic that cuts
across many disciplines and scales and is open to a wide range of methodological
approaches—remains undeveloped relative to its potential”).
8. Wernstedt et al., Brownfields Phenomenon, supra note 6, at 4.
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story,” and suggest that it is time for a more detailed analysis of
this story after a decade of experience with brownfields remediation and reuse, and, as a consequence, a re-examination of whether
brownfields programs meet their original goals, and whether those
goals were the right ones.
Those involved in brownfields remediation pin many hopes on
the process. They seek to discover and rehabilitate neglected sites,
reverse the decay of urban cores, and, in some cases, link with
smart growth strategies by slowing the march of development to
suburban and exurban America. The parcel-by-parcel approach to
brownfields remediation and reuse, however, cannot possibly guarantee all that. There are thousands of brownfields sites and each
has a different experience.9 As a leading study pointed out, “[e]ach
brownfield redevelopment decision can trigger a variety of concerns related to the long-term vision of a community, threats to
public health and nature, economic livelihoods, social equity, and
public participation.”10 The paradox of brownfields programs is
that they may have considerable legitimacy when one looks at the
successful remediation and reuse of individual parcels, but as a
whole, the policies may or may not be contributing measurably to
the long-term health of communities throughout the nation.
It is time to decide how nascent state programs could best promote a comprehensive approach to urban redevelopment. This in
turn requires us to decide whether the assumptions about
brownfields programs’ success are substantiated in practice. I am
not at all suggesting that brownfields revitalization needs to end,
yet, as I argue in this Article, the brownfields story is partly incorrect. Consider this recent summary: “Many of the premises [of
brownfields policies] may have a factual base, while others may be
rooted in unsubstantiated assertions of mixed quality or outright
misunderstandings.”11 As a result of this partial breakdown of the
story, it is time for a reorientation of brownfields law and policy
that moves it toward a development-centered approach to
brownfields, not one that caters specifically to developers.
In this Article, I will look at brownfields policies in one state,
New Jersey, and suggest how to make the approach of brownfields
9. For an early but still relevant and important discussion of a number of different experiences, see generally EDITH M. PEPPER, NORTHEAST-MIDWEST INST.,
LESSONS FROM THE FIELD: UNLOCKING ECONOMIC POTENTIAL WITH AN ENVIRONMENTAL KEY (1997), http://www.nemw.org/lessons.htm.
10. Wernstedt et al., Brownfields Phenomenon, supra note 6, at 4.
11. Id.
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revitalization more development-centered and less developer-centered. New Jersey’s program is worth examining for a number of
reasons. First, it has processed a large number of sites. There are
an estimated 10,000 brownfields sites in the state (though not all
have commercial potential),12 and a number of developers proceeded successfully to cleanups using the state Memorandum of
Agreement (“MOA”).13 In the state’s Voluntary Cleanup Program
(“VCP”),14 a party who wants to remediate a site enters into an
MOA with the state’s environmental agency, the Department of
Environmental Protection (“NJDEP” or “DEP”). The MOA, as is
typical for similar programs in other states, establishes the scope of
assessment and remediation activities, including anything from preliminary assessment at the site to remedial actions and reuse of the
site. New Jersey’s program is a typical one that allows all sites (not
just those designated as brownfields) to enter into the VCP, but
also has elements tailored specifically to brownfields, including a
statewide task force15 and an “Office of Brownfield Reuse.”16
There are some analyses17 and some limited empirical evidence18
12. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Site Remediation and Waste Mgmt. Program Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.state.nj.us/dep/srp/brownfields/faq/ (last visited
Mar. 31, 2007); see also Michael Greenberg et al., Brownfield Redevelopment and Affordable Housing: A Case Study of New Jersey, 12 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 515, 517
(2001), available at http://www.fanniemaefoundation.org/programs/hpd/pdf/HPD_
1203_greenberg.pdf [hereinafter Greenberg et al., Affordable Housing] (noting that
“only 1,157 of these 10,000 sites have commercial potential”).
13. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Voluntary Cleanup Program, http://www.nj.gov/dep/
srp/volclean/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2007) [hereinafter N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. Voluntary Cleanup]. New Jersey has two different MOAs: one for residential properties
and one for non-residential properties. See id.
14. Id.
15. N.J. Office of Smart Growth, Brownfields Redevelopment Task Force, http://
www.nj.gov/dca/osg/commissions/brownfields/taskforce.shtml (last visited Mar. 31,
2007). The Task Force was created in 1998 by the New Jersey Brownfield and Contaminated Site Remediation Act. See NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, NEW MISSION FOR
BROWNFIELDS: ATTACKING SPRAWL BY REVITALIZING OLDER COMMUNITIES 18–20
(2000), http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/REPORT200010BROWNFIELDS.pdf (discussing the Task Force and its activities).
16. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Office of Brownfield Reuse, http://www.nj.gov/dep/
srp/brownfields/obr/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2007).
17. See, e.g., Lynn Singband, Brownfield Redevelopment Legislation: Too Little,
but Never Too Late, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 314–15 (2003) (analyzing New
Jersey’s program “because New Jersey was one of the first states to pass brownfields
legislation; it is the most densely populated state, which makes development pressure
in the state enormous; and its legislation is a good example of a typical response to
brownfields”).
18. See generally MICHAEL GREENBERG ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR NEIGHBORHOOD
AND BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT, THE IMPACT OF MOTHBALLED INDUSTRIAL
SITES ON URBAN REDEVELOPMENT IN NEW JERSEY (2000), http://policy.rutgers.edu/
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about the program, as it was one of the earliest brownfields programs and has been in place for over a decade. New Jersey is also
attempting to use second-generation approaches19 to improve the
relationship of brownfields cleanups and urban redevelopment,
most notably the Brownfields Development Area (“BDA”).20 In
short, the brownfields program is maturing and growing , and well
worth the analytical look.
Following a basic description of the New Jersey program, I will
discuss two specific developments, the BDA initiative and the recent “Grace Period Rule,” that changed some aspects of the program. My aim is more modest than a full-scale re-evaluation of all
brownfields programs (or indeed of the New Jersey program in its
totality); instead I look at the experience within one program to
assess whether there is movement toward the development-centered approach. I find that some developments in New Jersey are
positive, notably the BDA’s approach to addressing multiple
brownfield sites concurrently in the same location. On the other
hand, the Grace Period Rule introduces the prospect for additional
delay in cleanups that is unwarranted given the current program
structure.
II.

DRAWBACKS

OF THE

BROWNFIELDS STORY

The prevailing brownfields story has been repeated so often that
it is essentially unchallenged. The story looks something like this: a
developer, perhaps a hospital or university that has no prior experience with the environmental enforcement scheme, decides to look
at a piece of abandoned or underused urban property, typically located in a declining Rust Belt city. While the abandoned property
was most likely a site with a history of industrial uses (although,
with its former owner out of the picture, it may be hard to tell), its
primary attribute is that no one has touched it for the last decade
or more. The site’s advantages are clear: it is large enough for development and located near railroads and other forms of transporbrownfields/mothballs2.pdf [hereinafter GREENBERG ET AL., BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT]; Greenberg et al., Affordable Housing, supra note 12.
19. See generally D. Evan van Hook et al., The Challenge of Brownfield Clusters:
Implementing a Multi-Site Approach for Brownfield Remediation and Reuse, 12
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 111 (2003) (discussing New Jersey’s Brownfields Development
Area (“BDA”) and terming it a second-generation approach).
20. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Brownfields Development Area Initiative, http://
www.state.nj.us/dep/srp/brownfields/bda/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2007) [hereinafter N.J.
Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Brownfields Development Area Initiative]; see also infra notes
171-75 and accompanying text (discussing the BDA initiative).

R
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tation;21 it is also within striking distance of a large population that
can provide jobs and shopping opportunities for the new shopping
center or hospital or (to be trendy) biotechnology research park.
Ultimately, the abandoned site that had been previously used for
manufacturing will become an apartment complex or a ballpark,
and yield a bushel of economic benefits to the municipality.
The prospective developer, inexperienced with environmental
enforcement, does not know where to start. It is afraid to contact
the state environmental protection department because it fears the
unknown. As much literature has explained, the developer may
face potential liability as an owner or operator under CERCLA
(or one of its state counterparts) as a result of taking ownership, or
even by undertaking to clean up and reuse the property.22
In most cases, the story assumes that residual contamination is
not all that serious—otherwise the site would have presumably attracted attention from state regulators who force site cleanups in
state CERCLA-like programs.23 So, the future of the developer
when it tackles an urban brownfields site is hardly a complete imponderable. The site might be more difficult to develop than its
greenfield counterpart24 and presents the potential of environmental risk. The developer faces two possible outcomes, with one far
more likely than the other. In the first scenario, the developer
steps in with the aid of incentives that tip the scale in favor of taking on risk. It finds that the site is not all that contaminated and
cleanup is therefore neither costly or difficult. It cleans up the site,
utters the proverbial sigh of relief, gets a state’s signoff through
some form of liability release, and moves on to build a Wal-Mart or
ballpark. In the second (less likely) scenario, the site is tossed back
into the enforcement hopper because a serious environmental
problem is discovered.

21. See Opp & Hollis, supra note 2, at 1.
22. See Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 898. This is somewhat internally inconsistent: it presumes that the developer has little knowledge of environmental matters but understands federal law well enough to know that if it becomes
involved with the property then it faces liability.
23. See id. at 899–900.
24. See, e.g., H. Wade VanLandingham et al., Public Strategies for Cost-Effective
Community Brownfield Redevelopment, Univ. of Louisville Ctr. for Envtl. Pol’y &
Mgmt., Practice Guide No. 1, at 1-2 (2002), http://cepm.louisville.edu/Pubs_WPapers/
practiceguides/PG1.pdf (noting that “[t]he process of developing a vacant or agricultural greenfield site is well understood. [and this] is not true of brownfield
redevelopment”).
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It is the uncertainty about whether a given site is a scenario one
site or a scenario two site that hampers remediation and reuse.25
The developer prepared a business case for its project which
showed that if the environmental cost (a number plugged into the
ubiquitous spreadsheet) becomes anything more than a de minimis
amount—half a million dollars, a million, or even more—it will
sink the profit of the development. Therefore, the developer, fearing the unknown, flees to the suburban greenfield location where
things are much more predictable;.26 there is no environmental
remediation cost27 and the land cost is less, therefore the project
cost is a known commodity. Moreover, the development is not
subject to the vagaries of the urban political landscape. Starting at
the pristine greenfield location, the developer can proceed with its
development in a relatively short timeframe: one year, maybe two,
but little more. The biotech research park is then open for operation, or the shopping mall with its trendy stores is turning out
denim and dollars. The urban brownfield site remains undisturbed,
awaiting a savvier, less risk-averse developer.
At the outset, then, the brownfields policymaker puts herself in
the developer’s shoes and asks, “Why would anyone run the risk
associated with urban brownfields sites?”28 The “why,” of course,
is increasingly addressed by programs that come to the aid of developers, attempting to make it possible for them to assess the environmental risks on properties, clean them up if necessary, and
then proceed to reuse, all in a streamlined fashion.29
25. Id. at 12–13.
26. See, e.g., id. at 3 (noting that “[g]reenfield sites (previously undeveloped
properties) are usually in such higher demand areas, cost less per acre to develop, and
do not involve as much risk and uncertainty for investors”).
27. This assumes the suburban or exurban site is not a brownfield. As a study by
the group Resources for the Future explains, this may not be the case. See Wernstedt
et al., Brownfields Phenomenon, supra note 6, at 7 (“Numerous brownfield sites can
be found in mining areas and more generally throughout rural America.”).
28. In his comments at the signing of the 2002 CERCLA amendments, President
George W. Bush stated:
Many communities and entrepreneurs have sought to redevelop brownfields.
Often they could not, either because of excessive regulation or because of
the fear of endless litigation. As a consequence, small businesses and other
employers have located elsewhere—pushing development farther and farther outward, taking jobs with them, and leaving cities empty.
Remarks on Signing the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act in Conshohocken, Pennsylvania, 38 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 52, 53 (Jan. 11,
2002), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wcomp/v38no2.html (follow link under
Bill Signing for Small Business Liability Relief & Brownfields Revitalization Act).
29. See, e.g., VanLandingham et al., supra note 24, at 3 (noting that “[t]he situation
changed in the 1990s as states passed laws and regulations including Voluntary
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Thus, from the beginning, the foundation of brownfields law and
policy has been developer-centered, not development-centered.30
Grounding revolutionary changes on liability protection for potential accidental and unforeseen victims of environmental liability enshrined the prominence of facilitating the real estate transaction at
a brownfields site.31 New Jersey describes its brownfields remediation process as “user friendly”32 and, compared to CERCLA,
claims that it is the height of responsiveness, not enforcement
“hide the ball.” The developer voluntarily signs a contract with the
state that specifies precisely what obligations it will undertake and
what cleanup it will perform.33 Since the inception of brownfields
remediation programs, there has been a sea of change in attitudes
toward the remediation of contaminated sites. To the development
community, the attitude change is a welcomed relief.
The result, not surprisingly, has been considerable interest in the
brownfields revitalization process, and it is no wonder that there
are many tools developed and sources available for pragmatic
brownfields redevelopment. There is an array of sources for financing, even insurance (which, even though underused at present,
has been developed in creative ways for brownfields redevelopment),34 and there are numerous guides to federal brownfields initiatives and state voluntary cleanup programs.35 Annual national
Cleanup Programs and more flexible cleanup standards for brownfields based on intended new uses of sites”).
30. See Singband, supra note 17, at 315 (noting that “current brownfield revitalization statutes will do little to increase brownfield redevelopment because they focus on
limited liability rather than on cost issues and public and environmental health and
safety”).
31. In the “go-go” real estate development market of the 1990s, this message resonated deeply. See, e.g., Opp & Hollis, supra note 2, at 8 (noting that “[t]he booming
economy of the late 90s undoubtedly also contributed to the increase in development
projects of all kinds”).
32. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Voluntary Cleanup, supra note 13.
33. The New Jersey MOA documents for residential and non-residential properties can be found at N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Memorandum of Agreement for Residential Props., http://www.nj.gov/dep/srp/volclean/moa2_res.htm (last visited Mar. 31,
2007) & N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Memorandum of Agreement for Non-Residential
Props., http://www.nj.gov/dep/srp/volclean/moa2_nr.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2007).
34. The EPA discusses successful uses of insurance at U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
Environmental Insurance Helps Ensure Redevelopment, EPA 500-F-03-232 (July
2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/success/insurance.pdf. See generally Peter B. Meyer et al., Brownfield Redevelopers’ Perceptions of Environmental
Insurance: An Appraisal and Review of Public Policy Options (Lincoln Inst. of Land
Pol’y, Working Paper WP02PM1, 2002), available at http://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/
dl/664_meyer02web.pdf.
35. See, e.g., CHARLES BARTSCH ET AL., COMING CLEAN FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A RESOURCE BOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP AND ECONOMIC DE-
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brownfields conferences attract thousands of participants.36 New
Jersey maintains a “site mart” that matches prospective developers
and prospective sites, a kind of eBay for brownfield sites in New
Jersey.37 The prevailing sense is that states are open for business
when it comes to brownfields. Indeed, brownfields incentives are
now one part of the increasing trend of localities offering incentives to attract real estate development.38
The primary brownfields incentives, of course, are those offered
by the voluntary cleanup programs now available in all but one
state that provide road maps for developers to approach state environmental agencies or brownfields revitalization agencies (if they
exist) and deal directly with the states.39 The new federal law proVELOPMENT OPPORTUNITIES (1996), available at http://www.nemw.org/cmclean.htm
[hereinafter BARTSCH ET AL., COMING CLEAN]; LINDA BREGGIN ET AL., A GUIDEBOOK
FOR
BROWNFIELD PROPERTY OWNERS (1999), available at http://
www.elistore.org/reports_detail.asp?id=459; BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE
GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY (Todd S. Davis ed., 2d ed.
2002); BROWNFIELDS LAW & PRACTICE: THE CLEANUP & REDEVELOPMENT OF CONTAMINATED LAND (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 1998 & Supp. 2005); ELIZABETH GLASS
GELTMAN, RECYCLING LAND: UNDERSTANDING THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF BROWNFIELD DEVELOPMENT (2000); IMPLEMENTING INSTITUTIONAL CONTROLS AT
BROWNFIELDS AND OTHER CONTAMINATED SITES (Amy L. Edwards ed., 2003); RONALD ROSENBERG, BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT: CLEANING UP CONTAMINATED
SITES FOR COMMUNITY RENEWAL (2000); RONALD ROSENBERG, COMMUNITY RESOURCE GUIDE FOR BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT (2002). For websites with useful
information see Center for Brownfields Initiatives at the University of New Orleans,
Homepage, http://www.brownfields.com (last visited Mar. 31, 2007); U.S. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, Brownfields Cleanup and Redevelopment Page, http://www.epa.gov/
brownfields (last visited Dec. 2, 2006); Nat’l Ctr. for Neighborhood and Brownfields
Redevelopment, Homepage, http://www.policy.rutgers.edu/brownfields (last visited
Mar. 31, 2007); Northeast-Midwest Institute, Homepage, http://www.nemw.org (last
visited Mar. 31, 2007).
36. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 4,000-plus Expected at 10th
National Brownfields Conference Nov. 2nd-4th at Denver’s Colorado Convention
Center (Mar. 10, 2005), http://yosemite.epa.gov/r8/r8media.nsf/Published%5C2005!
OpenView (follow “March” hyperlink).
37. See State of New Jersey, Brownfields Site Mart, http://www.njsitemart.com
(last visited Mar. 31, 2007).
38. VanLandingham et al., supra note 24, at 8 (“This expansion of state brownfield
programs is a logical outgrowth of broader state innovation and competition in efforts
to encourage new investment and associated economic development.”). Another
commentator sees brownsfields programs as more “politically acceptable” than direct
subsidies and other forms of aid to cities. See Michael R. Greenberg, Editorial, Reversing Urban Decay: Brownfield Redevelopment and Environmental Health, 111
ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. A74 (Feb. 2003), available at http://www.ehponline.org/docs/
2003/111-2/EHP111pa74PDF.PDF [hereinafter Greenberg, Editorial].
39. See Charles Bartsch, Brownfields State of the States in 2004, NE-MW ECON.
REV., Fall 2004, at 14, 14, available at http://www.nemw.org/ER%20brownfields.pdf
[hereinafter Bartsch, State of States] (noting that “[i]n 2004, South Dakota became the
49th state to adopt a formal brownfields program”).
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vides some shelter for a developer that engages with the state, reducing the risk (claimed to exist well over a decade ago)40 that the
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) will overfile41 and conclude that a cleanup completed successfully in a state program is
not acceptable at the federal level. The EPA’s new “all appropriate inquiries” rule apparently ensures that if a developer follows
procedures that are rapidly becoming widely accepted industry
standards it should have little to fear from the EPA.42
This brownfields story has led to certain basic trends in remediation and reuse. First and foremost, developers are treated as a
monolithic group in most voluntary cleanup programs. Virtually
anyone willing to tackle the remediation and reuse of a site can do
so, with few exceptions. Because developers engage voluntarily
with the state, they presumably lack culpability and, therefore, control the timing, sequencing, and even the comprehensiveness of
remediation and reuse. The developer that takes the lead at a
brownfield site dictates the terms of the cleanup and redevelopment strategy, otherwise it is assumed that it would not be worthwhile to proceed.43 The result is a level of trust unheard of in other
contexts. The MOA or a similar document empowers the developer to clean up the site, and the state’s role is limited to that of
overseer. This means that the remediation outcome is only as good
as the state’s ability to verify the results.44 In states where
remediation at a brownfield site can proceed without state involvement of any sort, the only verification is indirect through state-certified consultants who approve the cleanup results.45
What does the state get in return for ceding control? When a
developer comes to the state, it presumably has alternatives, including the option of no action. Without a developer ready to take
on the risk of developing a brownfield site (which is presumptively
40. See generally Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3.
41. See Opp & Hollis, supra note 2, at 7 (noting that “[t]his act works to limit
‘overfiling’ by the EPA when a cleanup occurs through a state program”).
42. See Standards and Practices for All Appropriate Inquiries, 40 C.F.R. § 312
(2005). The EPA’s “All Appropriate Inquiries” page is located at http://www.epa.gov/
brownfields/regneg.htm. Some commentators have observed that this rule may not
offer sufficient protection to brownfields developers. See, e.g., Strickland, supra note
4, at 790. At the very least, there is residual uncertainty. See Opp & Hollis, supra
note 2, at 7 (“Because the Act is still recent, its full effect on the status of brownfields
is not yet clear. While it does ease CERCLA liability and promote redevelopment of
sites, the provisions are lengthy and will undoubtedly be modified as the EPA provides further guidance and new judicial decisions arise.”).
43. See Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 965–70.
44. See id. at 1021.
45. See id. at 968–69.
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deemed to be higher than that of a greenfield site even though it
may not be), the brownfield site would remain fallow. In return for
its streamlining of the environmental law scheme, the state receives
a promise that the locality will see certain economic benefits once
the property is back in use in its commercial, retail, residential, or
other setting.46
This story, though appealing, may well turn out to be inaccurate
in whole or part in many cases. Brownfields policies were put into
place on the basis of considerable faith in the power of fear and the
resulting need to stop punishing developers, not the strength of
available data. On the whole, there is not as much knowledge
about the brownfields revitalization process as originally thought in
the 1980s and 1990s.47 There is a lack of satisfactory empirical evidence because, with roughly a decade of experience, studies of
brownfields law and policy are just now starting to emerge.48
There are essentially two types of studies underway: (1) those
involving problem characterization (how many brownfields sites
are in a given state or locality; how many of these have commercial
potential; and so forth);49 and (2) those developing a knowledge
base of success stories that prospective developers can use to develop their own roadmaps for successful cleanups at their sites.50
The latter includes case studies of individual brownfields sites in
Trenton,51 Worcester,52 Baltimore,53 and other ideal Rust Belt can46. Wernstedt et al., Brownfields Phenomenon, supra note 6, at 10 (discussing the
importance of economic benefits to brownfields redevelopment projects).
47. See id. at 4 (noting that empirical literature on brownfields remains
undeveloped).
48. An intriguing proposal to spur more studies is set forth in Dana, supra note 7,
at 86-87 (calling for “an amendment to the federal CERCLA statute that would limit
liability for participants in brownfields cleanups in states that employ a system of
standardized data-collection regarding the development, implementation, and outcomes of at least a significant sample of their approved brownfields cleanups”).
49. Wernstedt et al., Brownfields Phenomenon, supra note 6, at 5-6 (noting that “a
small number of studies have relied on original surveys to systematically collect information on the scope of the brownfields problem”). The National Center for Neighborhood and Brownfields Redevelopment at Rutgers University has collected data on
the number and attributes of mothballed brownfield sites. See generally GREENBERG
ET AL., BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT, supra note 18.
50. Wernstedt et al., Brownfields Phenomenon, supra note 6, at 5 (noting that
“much of what we know about brownfields and the barriers to their redevelopment
has come from case studies of individual redevelopment projects”).
51. Trenton is one of the EPA’s “Brownfields Showcase Communities.” See U.S.
Envtl. Prot. Agency, Trenton Brownfields Ride a Wave of Revitalization, EPA 500-F02-168 (2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/pdf/ss_trent.pdf.
52. The Northeast-Midwest Institute’s Lessons from the Field discusses the $200
million “Medical City” project that “involved cleaning up and reusing 24 acres of
blighted downtown property, and which is expected to create 3,000 new jobs and have

R
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didates for brownfields policies (as well as a number of others),54
where striking successes have been documented. Yet this anecdotal evidence of success, given the wide variety in approaches and
results, is perhaps most useful as a process guide for other cities,
not as a comprehensive justification of brownfields policies.55
Brownfields programs have not been studied in an overall systematic way,56 and it is possible that comprehensive studies would
show that the vast majority of sites involve a win-win of successful
remediation and benefits to the host community. Certainly those
high-profile sites trumpeted by the EPA and the states are, in fact,
places where benefits have materialized.57 Yet, the supporting data
is just now emerging.58
Does this relative lack of certainty matter? If redevelopment
potential is stymied by the fear of contamination at an urban site, a
suburban site, or even an exurban site, that any remediation and
reuse activity is better than the “no action” alternative. Yet just as
the status quo may be preferable to environmentally damaging activities in other contexts,59 it may be so here as well, where the
benefits of “no action” may outweigh the costs of increased human
activity at a brownfields site.60
a total direct economic impact of $875 million within its first ten years of operation.”
PEPPER, supra note 9, at ch. 1.
53. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Redevelopment Opportunities Taking Hold in
Baltimore, EPA 500-F-02-153 (2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/pdf/
ss_balti.pdf.
54. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Brownfields Success Stories, http://www.epa.gov/
brownfields/success.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2007).
55. Wernstedt et al., Brownfields Phenomenon, supra note 6, at 3-4 (noting that
“most brownfield efforts have taken a property-by-property approach that aims at
supporting the highest and best use of individual properties,” but ”[w]hether these
[brownfield success stories] have helped to revitalize distressed areas and contribute
to a more sustainable community is a more difficult question, however.”).
56. Id. at 1 (noting that “[u]nfortunately . . . the enthusiasm for brownfields reuse
generally has not been matched by systematic, careful documentation of actual practice at a wide range of sites”); see also Dana, supra note 7, at 101 (noting that as of
2005, the “paucity of our knowledge about the actual results of state brownfields
programs”).
57. See Brownfields Success Stories, supra note 54.
58. See generally Wernstedt et al., supra note 6, at 4-6 (discussing empirical studies
conducted as of 2004 and their limitations).
59. The example I have in mind is the requirement in the National Environmental
Policy Act to study the alternative of “no action” because it may turn out to be preferable to a federal agency’s chosen course of action. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332 (West
2000).
60. See, e.g., Dana, supra note 7, at 93–94.
One might argue that, regardless of the quality of a brownfields cleanup, and
even if the quality is significantly lower than would be required under CERCLA, some cleanup is better than no cleanup. All else being equal, perhaps
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First, state programs are not limited to urban sites with potential
for development. As a recent study explains, “[i]n theory,
brownfields programs focus on sites in urban areas and VCPs focus
on any site. The truth is that state programs often do not make
such distinctions.”61 Urban sites’ perceived advantages, in terms of
transportation, jobs, and so forth, turn out to be applicable to a
much smaller number of brownfields sites than envisioned by the
prevailing wisdom.62 More importantly, the promise of economic
benefits through redevelopment is not a requirement for a developer’s entry into the voluntary cleanup process. Some states such
as Michigan, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania63 attempt to make
some connection between brownfields cleanups and redevelopment efforts (but even those states typically tie a brownfield designation to eligibility for funding64 or other state benefits,65 not to
some cleanup is always better than no cleanup. But all else is not equal:
before a brownfields cleanup, a site may well not be in use or may be only
minimally in use, such that there are no or few contact points between site
contamination and human beings. After a cleanup and redevelopment, a
site may be the subject of intensive, daily use by a large number of people.
In other words, while one effect of a brownfields cleanup may be to reduce
the level of contamination, another effect may be to increase human exposure to the contamination on the site. To the extent that the second effect
dominates the first, a brownfields cleanup may, putting other benefits from
redevelopment aside, make matters worse. Some cleanup, in certain instances, may be worse than none.
Id.
61. Opp & Hollis, supra note 2, at 9.
62. Wernstedt et al., Brownfields Phenomenon, supra note 6, at 7. Nor are these
sites necessarily the former industrial sites envisioned by the model. One recent study
found that a minority of brownfield sites had “hosted light/heavy industry.” Id. (“Our
environmental insurance survey of nearly 50 private developers of brownfield sites
found that sites under redevelopment most commonly had hosted light/heavy industry
(32%), mixed use (26%), commercial (22%), and residential (11%) activities.”).
63. VanLandingham et al., supra note 24, at 8 (“The states with the most active
VCPs also tend to have special economic stimulus packages targeting brownfields, or
to regions or locations that are likely to contain them. Michigan, for example, provides special incentives to its ‘Renaissance Zones;’ Pennsylvania has a ‘Special Industrial Areas’ cleanup standard and other states have targeted their federally designated
Empowerment Zones or Enterprise Communities or their own state enterprise zones
for brownfields incentives.”).
64. The New Jersey DEP works with the state’s Economic Development Authority to provide money from the Hazardous Discharge Site Remediation Fund for site
remediation. Under state law, a developer that enters into a redevelopment agreement may potentially recoup up to seventy-five percent of her cleanup costs. See N.J.
Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Hazardous Discharge Site Remediation Fund, http://
www.nj.gov/dep/srp/finance/hdsrf/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2007); see also Martha N.
Donovan, How to Deal with NJDEP Violations, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Apr.
2006, at 29, http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2006/April/29.pdf (noting that
“[t]he New Jersey Commerce and Economic Growth Commission and the Depart-
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eligibility to enter a VCP).66 VCPs, however, are not primarily
concerned with the prospective developers’ motives. A developer
that plans to mothball a site is just as eligible as one who plans a
massive urban redevelopment project.67 Even where developers
plan for urban growth, the promised economic benefits may fail to
materialize. This is an area, of course, that has been studied extensively in urban policy literature and arose recently in Kelo v. City of
New London,68 where Justice O’Connor, in dissent, opposed a taking by the city of New London in part because it was grounded on
a redevelopment plan with hazy promises of future economic
benefits.69
The fear of environmental contamination and the high cost associated with remediation have proven less important to prospective
brownfields redevelopers than previously thought.70 One study
found that only eight percent of the cost of developing a brownfield site is attributable to the cost of environmental remediation.71
Another author observed that even after developers do some environmental assessments at brownfield sites, they still tend to overesment of Treasury, in consultation with NJDEP, negotiate and approve redevelopment
agreements if the project is appropriate and reasonable and there is a clear indication
that, but for the availability of the funding, the developer is not going to do the
project”).
65. See, e.g., Opp & Hollis, supra note 2, at 9-10.
VCPs vary in their focus, with some emphasizing redevelopment of sites
more heavily than others. The level of redevelopment incentives also depends upon which state organization oversees the state program. If it is an
economic development department rather than an environmental department, the state brownfield program will be more likely to offer economic
incentives to developers and to have variable cleanup standards, rather than
adhering to more stringent cleanup standards.
Id.
66. Eligibility in New Jersey’s VCP is extended to “[a]ny person not subject to the
New Jersey Underground Storage of Hazardous Substances Act or the Industrial Site
Recovery Act.” N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 7:26C-3.2(a) (2005).
67. This phenomenon is discussed in GREENBERG ET AL., BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT, supra note 18, at i (noting that “[o]nly anecdotal information exists . . .
about the prevalence of the problem”).
68. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
69. Id. at 495 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
70. See Wernstedt et al., Brownfields Phenomenon, supra note 6, at 9 (“Recent
work also has explored the economics of brownfields redevelopment, suggesting that
contamination may not be as significant a constraint to property transactions as the
prevailing sentiment of the 1980s and early 1990s suggested.”).
71. See Greenberg et al., Affordable Housing, supra note 12, at 518 (citing a study
by the Council for Urban Economic Development [now the International Economic
Development Council, or IEDC]).
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timate the remaining environmental risk.72 More importantly,
studies based on surveys of real estate developers found many reasons other than environmental risk that led developers to shun urban sites, including “basic real estate fundamentals.”73
There are two sets of potential problems relating to treating developers as a monolithic group. First, a developer, unlike the
“newbie” volunteer of the brownfields story, may not be so innocent. Consider two different but related possibilities. The developer, far from being unfamiliar with the environmental
enforcement system, may in fact be quite savvy and manipulate the
system by enrolling a less meritorious site in the state’s voluntary
cleanup program (perhaps even one that should be subject to state
environmental enforcement).74 While states are supposed to have
checks in place to ensure this does not happen, there are instances
where sites may fall through the cracks for one reason or another.
There may not be the resources or political will for vigorous
gatekeeping.
Second, the conduct of a cleanup can fall off the rails and come
up far short of the one that we expect from an innocent developer.
The cleanup program, of course, can encourage or discourage inadequate cleanups by its structure. A cleanup can take a long time
under an MOA if a developer does not do what it promised to do,
or if the cleanup takes longer than expected and the state does not
devote enough oversight attention to it.75
There is also a temporal element to this. A developer may attempt to conduct remediation in the right way, but it may later be
discovered that it was not done correctly. This failure can be attributable to cleanup standards that are streamlined76 in voluntary
cleanup programs, which is one of the program’s major attrac72. See VanLandingham et al., supra note 24, at 12 (noting that prospective
brownfields developers “tend to exaggerate the project uncertainty that remains
[even] after completion of a site assessment that meets the [American Society for
Testing and Materials] ASTM standards”).
73. See Wernstedt et al., Brownfields Phenomenon, supra note 6, at 9 (finding that
“basic real estate fundamentals often pose more significant obstacles to redevelopment of any previously used urban land than does contamination”).
74. See Dana, supra note 7, at 87 (noting that “brownfields programs are likely to
be used to address even very seriously contaminated sites that are not already subject
to a CERCLA cleanup”).
75. There are other possibilities; for example, differing results due to variations in
the skill and competence of consultants hired to do cleanups. See Shari Shapiro, The
Effectiveness of Pennsylvania’s Act 2: Are Good Mechanics Enough?, 24 TEMP.
ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 441, 455 (2005).
76. Or perhaps a process of assessing the site that requires hasty judgments. See
Greenberg, Editorial, supra note 38, at A74.
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tions.77 These streamlined cleanup standards often allow developers to use “institutional controls,” the popular means of fencing,
zoning controls, deed, or covenant restrictions78 that do not involve
actual cleanups at the sites.79 It is conceivable that this harnessing
of contamination (rather than an actual cleanup80) could fail years
later.81 This may be yet another indication that the program adopts
Environmental scientists working in state and local government may find
brownfields cases placed at the top of their action list, with a demand for
action in a matter of a few weeks or a month, rather than months or years.
Environmental health scientists in companies will be pressed to develop and
use monitoring equipment that provides quick and decisive information to
investors.
Id.
77. Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 933; see also Wernstedt et al.,
Brownfields Phenomenon, supra note 6, at 13 (observing that “the relative effectiveness of nonfinancial interventions—a change in regulatory requirements such as reducing cleanup standards or liability relief that releases ‘innocent’ parties at
contaminated sites from long-term damage claims—may be even more critical [to success of brownfields remediation and reuse]”).
78. See Wernstedt et al., Brownfields Phenomenon, supra note 6, at 10.
[C]leanup approaches at many brownfield properties often rely on legal
mechanisms referred to as “institutional controls”—such as zoning, property
easements and covenants, and well drilling bans—to restrict property uses at
a site with residual contamination. In our environmental insurance study,
for example, 38% of the developers noted the use of one or more institutional controls, most commonly government controls such as zoning and permitting requirements.
Id.
79. This is an accepted means of dealing with brownfield sites in New Jersey:
There are several ways to comply with DEP’s cleanup standards and criteria.
And, while permanent remedies are preferred, it is understood and recognized in New Jersey statutes that it does not always make sense to remove all
contamination at a site. When a “cleanup” limits workers’ and residents’
exposure to contamination and is protective of human health and the environment, DEP can and has approved such remedial actions.
N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Site Reuse Opportunities and Cleanup Tools, http://
www.nj.gov/dep/srp/brownfields/site_reuse.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2007).
80. See Wernstedt et al., Brownfields Phenomenon, supra note 6, at 10 (“These
institutional controls do not so much as enhance environmental quality through the
elimination or treatment of contamination as they provide protection by limiting exposure to it.”). The title of a workshop at the Brownfields 2005 conference sums it up
nicely: “Institutional Controls: The Achilles Heel of the Brownfields Program (&
What Can be Done to Fix this Flaw).” Brownfields 2006, http://www.brownfields2006.
org/en/SessionsPast.Browser.aspx (select “Brownfields 2005,” then search “Search
Text” for “The Achilles Heal of the Brownfields Program”) (last visited Mar. 31,
2007). See also Schofield, supra note 4, at 956–57 (noting that in passing the 2002
CERCLA amendments “Congress appears to have improperly assumed that institutional controls as currently implemented can protect human health and the
environment”).
81. Enforcement of these restrictions down the line against subsequent landowners, largely a creature of real property law, can also prove difficult. See generally
Andrea Ruiz-Esquide, The Uniform Environmental Covenants Act-An Environmental
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a developer-centered approach that is not sufficiently protective of
the environment.82
Experience with state voluntary cleanup programs may tell us
that they need to be revised, and yet the early record has not frequently led to fine tuning of programs. New Jersey made some
adjustments, so it is worth seeing whether the state critically examined the brownfields story and took additional steps to protect
the environment.
III.

NEW JERSEY’S VOLUNTARY CLEANUP PROGRAM:
TESTING THE BROWNFIELDS STORY

New Jersey’s VCP began in 1992, making it one of the oldest in
the country.83 The program is governed by oversight rules available on the DEP’s website,84 and it allows developers flexibility to
conduct remediation at their own schedule, which is a critical element in any brownfields or voluntary cleanup program.85 Additionally, the developer may terminate the MOA on its own if it so
desires, and parties may select a partial investigation or cleanup
without fear of penalties.86 Like other VCPs, not all contaminated
sites qualify.87 Sites subject to the state superfund-like law, known
as the “Spill Act,”88 or the federal CERCLA program are not eligible to take part in the VCP.89 Also, under the oversight rules, the
Justice Perspective, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1007 (2004) (discussing the problem of enforcement and the Uniform Environmental Covenants Act).
82. See Greenberg, Editorial, supra note 38, at A74.
I have learned that some local governments do not differentiate between
brownfield and uncontaminated sites. For example, the fact that a project
has a major plume beneath it and that the plume is draining into a river that
feeds into a potable water supply will not discourage some developers from
expecting environmental scientists to agree with redevelopment schemes
that pose measurable public health and ecologic risks. Deed restrictions that
require occupants not to dig underground or not to use basements for a bedroom may not be followed or enforced.
Id.
83. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Voluntary Cleanup, supra note 13.
84. N.J. ADMIN. CODE §§ 7:26C-1.1 to -11.4 (2006).
85. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Voluntary Cleanup, supra note 13; see also supra
note 43 and accompanying text.
86. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Voluntary Cleanup, supra note 13.
87. Id.
88. Spill Compensation and Control Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10 (West 2006).
89. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 7:26C-2.2.
If the Department, in the exercise of its enforcement discretion, chooses to
allow a person who is not subject to the Industrial Site Recovery Act or the
New Jersey Underground Storage of Hazardous Substances Act to conduct
remediation at a known or suspected contaminated site or area/areas of concern at a site, which the Department has not scheduled for publicly funded
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DEP may terminate an MOA if it establishes that a property is
“heavily contaminated and possesses an immediate environmental
concern.”90 In that case, the DEP conducts a cleanup using funds
from the Spill Compensation Fund, New Jersey’s equivalent of the
Superfund, and recovers the cost of the cleanup from the responsible party.91
The VCP is not limited to brownfields sites.92 Indeed, the state
says “the VCP has also dovetailed nicely within the department’s
brownfields initiatives for providing a tool for easier and faster reuse of formerly contaminated facilities.”93 Subchapter Three of the
DEP’s Oversight Rules provides the framework for conducting
voluntary cleanups, known as the “Administrative Process for Voluntary Cleanups.”94 This subchapter identifies the general requirements for an MOA, the process to request the DEP’s oversight of
the brownfields cleanup, and the procedures for termination of an
MOA.95 It provides a one-step application for the entry into an
MOA with the DEP and sets forth specific content requirements,
including “the applicant shall conduct all remediation pursuant to
the Technical Requirements for Site Remediation.”96 Thus, the
cleanup standards are the same as for other contaminated sites.
Under these rules, MOAs can be processed in one step.97 Once the
department determines that an application is administratively complete, the MOA is in place.98
The recent Grace Period Rule (“Rule”), promulgated on September 20, 2006, modifies the voluntary cleanup program oversight
remediation, then such participation shall be governed by a memorandum of
agreement in accordance with N.J.A.C. 7:26C-3.
Id.
The VCP web page indicates that:
It should be noted that not all contaminated properties qualify for the program. Some properties subject to the Industrial Site Recovery Act and the
Underground Storage Tank or Federal Superfund programs are not part of
the VCP. Also, if an investigation reveals that a property is heavily contaminated and posses [sic] an immediate environmental concern (an acute, direct
threat to human health or the environment), the department will conduct an
immediate cleanup using funds from the Spill Compensation Fund.
N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Voluntary Cleanup, supra note 13.
90. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Voluntary Cleanup, supra note 13.
91. See id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. N.J. ADMIN. CODE §§ 7:26C-3.1 to -3.4.
95. Id.
96. Id. § 7:26C-3.3(a)3.iii.
97. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Voluntary Cleanup, supra note 13.
98. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 7:26C-3.3(a).
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rules.99 The Rule was promulgated in response to a 1993 New
Jersey statute, popularly known as the “Grace Period Law”
(“GPL”), intended to allow those charged with “minor” violations
of state environmental laws to fix them within a designated period
of time (hence the name) without penalty.100 The Rule revised the
DEP’s imposition of penalties for violations of a number of New
Jersey’s enforcement laws.101 Specific grace periods, ranging from
thirty to sixty days or more, are made available for specified violations deemed minor.102 Part of the Rule amends Subchapter
Three. Under current law, the DEP may terminate an MOA in
three different sets of circumstances: if the person responsible for
conducting remediation has (1) “not made scheduled submissions
to the department pursuant to the schedule set forth in the MOA
application; (2) has failed to pay the department’s oversight cost;
or (3) has failed to submit documents required by an [MOA] in
accordance with the technical requirements.”103 The Rule adds
that the termination of an MOA allows the DEP to “pursue an
enforcement action against the responsible party for violations of
any statute or implementing rule, conduct the remediation using
public funds, and recover those costs from the responsible party or
any other actions permitted under law.”104 Thus, the remediation
of a site where an applicant had its MOA terminated is governed

99. See 38 N.J. Reg. 3821(a) (Sept. 18, 2006) (codified in scattered sections of N.J.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 7), available at http://www.nj.gov/dep/rules/adoptions/2006_0815
grace.pdf.
100. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1D (West 2003).
101. As the preamble explains:
The Department of Environmental Protection hereby adopts amendments
to the Department Oversight of the Remediation of Contaminated Sites
Rules, N.J.A.C. 7:26C (Oversight Rules) to set forth penalties for violations
of the Underground Storage Tank Rules, N.J.A.C. 7:14B (UST Rules), the
Industrial Site Recovery Act Rules, N.J.A.C. 7:26B (ISRA Rules), the
Oversight Rules, N.J.A.C. 7:26C, and the Technical Requirements for Site
Remediation Rules (Technical Rules.), N.J.A.C. 7:26E, and identify these
violations as either minor or non-minor for the purpose of providing grace
periods in accordance with P.L. 1995, c. 296 (N.J.S.A. 13:1D-125 et seq.),
commonly known as the Grace Period Law. The amendments to these rules
set forth how the Department will respond to any violation identified as
minor.
38 N.J. Reg. 3821(a) (codified in scattered sections of N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7), available at http://www.nj.gov/dep/rules/adoptions/2006_0815grace.pdf.
102. See id.
103. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 7:26C-3.3(c).
104. Id. § 7:26C-3.3(c)5 (2006).
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by an Administrative Consent Order, the familiar document mandating cleanup under the Spill Act.105
In purported compliance with the requirement of the GPL, the
DEP also extended the period of time allowed to correct the three
deficiencies that would ordinarily allow the DEP to terminate an
MOA.106 The new rule reads as follows: “The department may
provide the person responsible for conducting the remediation a
period of time to correct the deficiency identified in (c)(1).i
through iii, above, in order to achieve compliance with the memorandum of agreement and avoid termination of the memorandum
of agreement pursuant to (c)(3) below.”107
While the DEP deems this comparable to the specific grace periods extended to responsible parties conducting cleanups under enforcement-driven laws, it clearly is not. For enforcement-driven
laws, the new Rule provides tables and charts establishing the
range of “minor” violations with specific grace periods and time
limits. By contrast, the language “a period of time” is not defined
in the new language in Subchapter three. It appears that a brownfield developer operating under an MOA could argue for an indefinite extension of time to complete a cleanup. The DEP’s
comments on the Rule imply that the DEP will do everything it can
to accommodate developers.108 Any action undertaken pursuant
105. See Spill Compensation and Control Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10 (West 2006);
see also N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, Voluntary Cleanup, supra note 13.
106. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 7:26C-3.3(c)3.
107. Id.
108. See 38 N.J. Reg. 3821(a) (Sept. 18, 2006) (codified in scattered sections of N.J.
ADMIN CODE tit. 7), available at http://www.nj.gov/dep/rules/adoptions/2006_0815
grace.pdf.
[T]his adoption amends the provision at N.J.A.C. 7:26C-3.3(c)2 to allow a
volunteer remediating a site pursuant to an MOA a period of time to correct
a deficiency in complying with the MOA prior to termination. This will further encourage voluntary remediation including the remediation of
brownfields by giving the volunteer every possible opportunity to succeed in
the remediation process. If the volunteer is deficient in complying with the
terms of the MOA (e.g., fails to submit a document in accordance with the
schedule that the volunteer submitted to the Department), the Department
will notify the volunteer of the deficiency, and allow the volunteer time to
correct the deficiency. During that time period, the Department encourages
dialogue between the volunteer and the Department’s case manager to resolve any differences, thus fostering a more collegial relationship. This positive relationship and experience can only lead to more developers seeking to
develop brownfield sites, thus promoting smart growth and the economic
well being of the State.
Id. (emphasis added).
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to an MOA properly could be viewed as “minor” under the terms
of the Rule and subject to an extension of time.
This prospect for delay could be deleterious to the success of the
program in the case of a developer who is not innocent, as the
brownfields story assumes. The DEP’s staff prepared a “Vulnerability Assessment” in 2002,109 essentially a description of areas
where the environmental programs administered by the state were
not meeting legal requirements either because they were understaffed, underfunded, or simply overwhelmed. The DEP staff generated information about the VCP,110 which stated in part that
seven percent of the sites with MOAs governing cleanups are
“non-performers” because they are not meeting their legal obligations under their MOAs.111 This figure is perhaps even more surprising when one considers that a number of sites with MOAs
governing cleanups are residential real estate transactions where
potential buyers are concerned with the condition of petroleum
storage tanks. These tank cleanups are conducted with a “speedy
turnaround,” the goal being to allow sellers “to present a ‘No Further Action Letter’ to buyers in time for settlement.”112 Given the
likelihood that most residential tank cleanups are done in short order, the seven percent non-performer figure is probably higher for
developers remediating more typical brownfields sites.
There is reason for concern about the pace of cleanups undertaken under developers’ control. The DEP’s internal Vulnerability
Assessment stated in part, “[t]here are 4921 active MOAs with an
109. See N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Site Remediation & Waste Mgmt. Program, Site
Remediation Program Vulnerability Assessment (2002), available at http://
www.peer.org/docs/nj/06_17_8_dep_vulnerable_srp.pdf [hereinafter N.J. Dep’t of
Envtl. Prot., Site Remediation & Waste Mgmt. Program]; see also News Release, Pub.
Employees for Envtl. Responsibility, Call for Inspector General to Head Mercury
Day-Care Probe, Severe Toxic Problems Acknowledged in 2002 Internal “Vulnerability Assessment” (Aug. 17, 2006), http://www.peer.org/news/news_id.php?row_id=728
[hereinafter Inspector General] (referring to “a confidential internal DEP ‘Vulnerability Assessment’ review of the troubled site cleanup program conducted by former
DEP Commissioner Bradley Campbell in February 2002”).
110. See N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Site Remediation & Waste Mgmt. Program,
supra note 109. The final “Vulnerability Assessment” did not include the information
about the VCP; the confidential internal assessment was later made available to the
New Jersey chapter of PEER. See News Release, Inspector General, supra note 109;
E-mail from Bill Wolfe, Director, N.J. PEER, to Joel B. Eisen, Professor of Law,
University of Richmond School of Law (Sept. 22, 2006, 10:00:31 EST) (on file with
author).
111. See N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Site Remediation & Waste Mgmt. Program,
supra note 109.
112. N.J. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., Voluntary Cleanup, supra note 13.
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average age of 3.5 years.”113 The length of three and one half years
is in and of itself fairly striking, being longer than the quick turnaround in the brownfields story. It is a sizeable fraction, roughly
one-third to one-half, of the time period of the average CERCLA
cleanup.114 Given that a number of sites handled by MOAs involve
residential tank cleanups, it appears that other sites involve
remediation periods beyond the three and one half year average.115
This is inconsistent with the brownfields story’s notion that the developer comes in, remediates quickly, and moves on. Without
more empirical analysis, it is hard to discern the root cause of this
problem. It may be that developers are addressing more seriously
contaminated sites in the VCP when the sites should be handled
elsewhere. It may also be that the state has every intention of handling a site quickly, but a developer delays the process.116
The standards governing cleanups are the same in either case,117
so the primary difference between enforcement sites and those in
the VCP inheres in allowing developers proceeding under MOAs
to control the cleanups. If the developer controls the cleanup,
there are fewer guarantees that it will be handled properly, and it is
difficult for a state to discern whether the developer has followed
the MOA’s terms.118 The three and one half year figure suggests
that some developers may in fact fail to follow their MOA obliga113. See N.J. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., Site Remediation & Waste Mgmt. Program,
supra note 109.
114. See Jonathan Cannon, Adaptive Management in Superfund: Thinking Like a
Contaminated Site, 13 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 561, 592 (2005) (noting that “EPA has
estimated the average time from proposal for listing on the NPL to completion of the
remedial action at approximately eight years, but a recent study by Resources for the
Future calculates the average instead at over eleven years”).
115. E-mail from Bill Wolfe, supra note 10 (stating that “[a]nd that 3.5 years is an
AVERAGE—it includes lots of residential tank pulls, which can be done in weeks or
months, not years.”).
116. Without a harder look at state records, this would be extremely difficult to
assess. Yet that discerning analysis is most urgently needed. This trend is unfortunately all too common in brownfields law and policy. There is a dismaying tendency
across the nation to evaluate state brownfields programs by relying on formal statutes
and regulations, not by digging down to “[l]ess formal agency documents, such as
written policies and memos, as well as any actual anecdotes or aggregate data regarding brownfields projects.” See Dana, supra note 7, at 101.
117. See In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 7:26E-1.13, 871 A.2d 711 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2005).
118. See, e.g., Amy Pilat McMorrow, Note, CERCLA Liability Redefined: An Analysis of the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act and Its
Impact on State Voluntary Cleanup Programs, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1087, 1120 (2004)
(noting that “[e]ven if the cleanup is sufficient, varying degrees of site cleanliness
throughout a city or state may become a monitoring burden for the EPA or state
environmental agencies”).
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tions. In its response to comments on the draft Rule, the DEP acknowledged that “the department has found that all too often the
volunteer chooses not to follow the terms of the MOA even though
it is the volunteer that proposed them in the application.”119 New
Jersey also appears to be moving toward having more licensed consultants supervise brownfield cleanups without additional state
oversight.120 As in other states where this is a model for remediation, this too adds to the prospect of a developer running amok.
A recent and notorious New Jersey case highlighted the potential disaster involved with allowing developers to control their own
cleanups. It involved perhaps one of the worst possible nightmares
for state regulators: residual toxic contamination at a day care
center, which was brought to the entire state’s attention by sick
children and front page articles in major newspapers.121 The “Kiddie Kollege” day care site was previously the location of a factory
used for manufacturing thermometers and related instruments.122
Throughout the 1980s, the DEP monitored pollution at the site and
oversaw hazards caused by mercury discharges. In 1994, the manufacturer ended its operations. Under New Jersey’s environmental
transfer act (the Industrial Site Recovery Act, or “ISRA”123), this
should have triggered a cleanup of the mercury at the site. Instead
the manufacturer, Accutherm, went bankrupt and failed to comply
with ISRA’s requirements.124
119. See 38 N.J. Reg. 3821(a) (Sept. 18, 2006) (codified in scattered sections of N.J.
ADMIN CODE tit. 7), available at http://www.nj.gov/dep/rules/adoptions/2006_0815
grace.pdf.
120. New Jersey instituted a “Cleanup Star” program, under which the DEP “will
pre-qualify environmental consultants meeting rigorous education, experience and
professional requirements as ‘Cleanup Stars.’ ” N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Voluntary
Cleanup, supra note 13. As the VCP web page indicates, “[t]hese ‘Cleanup Stars’ will
be permitted to investigate and remediate certain low-priority sites and areas of concern with limited NJDEP oversight. NJDEP will strictly audit Cleanup Stars’ work to
ensure regulatory compliance and protection of public health and the environment.”
Id.
121. See Sam Wood et al., Second Township Day-Care Operated on Toxic Ground,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 20, 2006, at A01, available at http://www.philly.com/mld/inquirer/15317594.htm; see also Tina Kelley, New Jersey Vows to Overhaul Environmental Cleanup Work, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2006, at B2, available at http://
travel2.nytimes.com/2006/10/24/nyregion/24dep.html (describing the aftermath of the
Kiddie Kollege fiasco); News Release, Pub. Employees for Envtl. Responsibility,
MERCURY-LADEN DAY-CARE CENTER IN NEW JERSEY IS NO ANOMALY—Lax State
Brownfield Laws Make Tragedy an “Accident Waiting to Happen” (Aug. 7, 2006),
http://www.peer.org/news/news_id.php?row_id=722 [hereinafter Mercury-Laden DayCare].
122. See News Release, Mercury-Laden Day Care, supra note 121.
123. Industrial Site Recovery Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K (West 2003).
124. See Sam Wood et al., supra note 121, at A01.
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Various investigations were done at the site between 1994 and
1995.125 In 1996, the DEP requested that the EPA regional office
perform an assessment of the property,126 which found “several
small droplets of mercury were located on the floor of an area believed to be one of the production rooms.”127 In 1996, however,
the site was deemed ineligible for a removal action conducted
under CERCLA.128 The property was transferred to Navillus
Group in 1997.129 In 2002, Jim Sullivan, Inc. purchased the site
from Navillus and two years later converted the property to a day
care center.130
In April, 2006, the DEP contacted the new property owner, Jim
Sullivan of Jim Sullivan, Inc., to determine what measures, if any,
had been undertaken to address site contamination.131 A discussion ensued and on June 21, 2006, DEP informed Sullivan that he
should enter the VCP and submit an MOA application.132 One
month later, the sampling found mercury in the building and
“based on these findings and consultation with NJDEP and
NJDH&SS [New Jersey Department of Health and Senior Services] technical staff, it was determined that the building was not fit
for occupancy at this time.”133 Thus, a site which should have been
cleaned up as a mercury hazard wound up (at least for a period of
time) being considered for the VCP.
The facts of the Kiddie Kollege scenario may be a bit unusual.
The story does highlight, however, the possibility in states with voluntary cleanup programs whose eligibility is open to all sites, not
just brownfields sites, to have contamination exceed the “light con125. Mercury Timeline, Information, http://www.nbc10.com/news/9655585/detail.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2007) (detailing a bank’s environmental investigation in
1994 and a NJDEP investigation of the exterior of the site in 1995).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. According to the timeline released by the DEP, the EPA concluded on
January 16, 1996 “that based on air monitoring, soil sample analysis, wipe sample
analysis and the condition and security of the building and surrounding property, the
site does not present an immediate threat to human health or the environment.’ ” Id.
A “NJDEP Memorandum to the File” in June indicated that the EPA had “determined that the site was not eligible for a removal action; however, due to documented
contamination present, the site require further investigation and remediation.” Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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tamination” levels expected under the brownfields story.134 That a
site such as Kiddie Kollege may fall through the cracks should
serve as a warning to New Jersey and other states to revise the
assumptions they make about brownfield sites and look for more
of a demonstration from innocent developers up front. States
should check the history of sites more thoroughly to see whether
the site or any developer associated with the site is or should be
involved in a pending enforcement action.
New Jersey and other states should also address what happens if
remediation turns out to be inadequate. Some brownfields developers do not fit the story of the innocent developer who wishes to
proceed quickly through a state voluntary cleanup program, receive liability protection, and move on with development.135 In this
sense, New Jersey’s Grace Period Rule is the wrong approach because it gives recalcitrant developers more time for delay. The
Rule gives developers an indefinite period of time to correct any
deficiencies the DEP may have discovered while overseeing the
remediation process; this is susceptible to manipulation by unscrupulous developers.
The DEP has the option under the Rule to terminate an
MOA.136 The developer whose MOA is terminated may reapply
and pay a $1,000 reapplication fee.137 In the context of a large site
with considerable complexity, and perhaps extensive contamination, $1,000 is clearly de minimis. In contrast, the commenters on
drafts of the Rule, nearly all of whom represented developers or
were themselves developers, perceived that any change to the VCP
to impose additional requirements on developers was clearly unwarranted.138 This is another unfortunate outcome of a developercentered approach. It allows developers to believe that any hindrance to cleanup and reuse of a brownfield site, no matter how

134. See Kelley, supra note 121, at B2 (quoting public officials and representatives
of public interest environmental groups who favor an overhaul of New Jersey’s
cleanup programs in the aftermath of the Kiddie Kollege fiasco).
135. See 38 N.J. Reg. 3821(a) (Sept. 18, 2006) (codified in scattered sections of N.J.
ADMIN CODE tit. 7), available at http://www.nj.gov/dep/rules/adoptions/2006_0815
grace.pdf (“Frivolous MOAs contribute to Departmental caseload management difficulties and require Department staff to direct their time towards cases in which there
was never an intention by the person responsible for conducting the remediation to
do any remedial work at the site.”).
136. See id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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small, is a “take back” that hampers the program.139 No one would
doubt the ability of developers and their representatives to plead
their case. Yet, catering to them makes a $1,000 reapplication fee a
program “drawback,” even though the fee may have been imposed
after a developer consistently flouted the Oversight Rules.
The DEP’s ability to terminate an MOA and move a site into the
enforcement category appears, at first blush, a strong and credible
threat. Yet the DEP itself stated that it does not intend to increase
the number of MOAs it terminates.140 As Professor David Dana
has expressed cogently, there are numerous reasons why a state
environmental agency might not want to bring enforcement action
at a brownfield site, most notably that it would have to admit that
its oversight failed.141 In New Jersey’s case, the state made its intent quite clear. In its responses to comments on the Rule it stated,
“[t]he Grace Period amendments do not apply to the Voluntary
Cleanup Program; hence there will be no enforcement of
MOAs.”142 Some expressed concern that even if the state were
willing to act more forcefully, it lacks the resources to follow
139. State regulators may even believe that gathering more comprehensive data on
cleanups and their efficacy might hamper a program’s progress. See Dana, supra note
7, at 103 (noting that “[d]evelopers might not want outcomes at their sites measured
for fear that the data would be used by regulators as a basis for re-opening the
brownfields cleanups pursuant to re-opener clauses in the agreements between developers and the state government”).
140. See 38 N.J. Reg. 3821(a) (stating that “[t]he Department does not intend to
increase the number of MOAs that it terminates”).
141. See Dana, supra note 7, at 95.
[P]eople and institutions prefer not to admit that they were wrong, particularly about a public health matter, either to themselves (which is psychologically upsetting) or to others (which is damaging to one’s reputation). Once a
state agency has expressly approved, even subsidized in many cases, a
brownfields cleanup, its staff may not relish acknowledging that the site
poses some health or environmental risk and that more remediation is therefore necessary. After all, doing so would be perceived (rightly or wrongly)
as an acknowledgement that the original cleanup plan approved by regulators was inadequate or inadequately supervised by those regulators.
Id.
142. See 38 N.J. Reg. 3821(a); see also E-mail from Bill Wolfe, Director, N.J.
PEER, to Joel B. Eisen, Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law
(Sept. 20, 2006, 21:10:39 EST) (on file with author).
The other big policy issue is the accommodation of the industry view on
applicability—if a MOA was executed on a voluntary basis, the DEP has
agreed to honor that voluntary expectation. So in addition to not terminating any more MOA’s, the DEP will not issue enforcement action for failing
to accomplish the tasks and commitments set forth in the MOA regardless of
how bad the MOA is performaing[sic] or what the impact is on health or
environment.
E-mail from Bill Wolfe, supra.
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through on enforcement (for example, to enter into more Administrative Consent Orders).143
Assuming for the moment that the state could (or would) proceed with enforcement activities against a brownfields developer,
the recent controversies surrounding the cleanup program cast
doubt on the program’s ability to get sites cleaned up correctly and
promptly. The New Jersey General Assembly has held hearings
over the past year about cleanups at major sites that appear to
have been botched.144 With respect to one aspect of toxic waste
cleanup—proceeding to address the worst sites first—internal documents from the DEP made available to the organization Public
Employees for Environmental Responsibility (“PEER”) show that
the Spill Act program lags behind its statutory deadlines to provide
and use a risk-based list ranking of the most dangerous sites.145
143. Telephone Call from Bill Wolfe, Director, N.J. PEER, to Joel B. Eisen, Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law (Sept. 18, 2006) (transcript on file
with author).
144. See, e.g., Testimony from Invited Individuals, Including Representatives of the
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, Concerning the Use and Disposal of Contaminated Concrete Materials at Redevelopment Sites in Mercer, Middlesex and Ocean Counties from the Ford Motor Company Site in Edison Township,
Middlesex County Before the Joint Comm. Meeting of the Assemb. Judiciary Comm.
and Assemb. Environment & Solid Waste Comm. (N.J. June 1, 2006), available at
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/legislativepub/pubhear/ajuaen060106.pdf; Transcript of
the Comm. Meeting of the Assemb. Judiciary Comm. (N.J. June 15, 2006), available
at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/legislativepub/pubhear/aju061506.pdf; see also Testimony from Invited Individuals, Including Representatives of the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, Concerning the Use and Disposal of
Contaminated Concrete Materials at Redevelopment Sites in Mercer, Middlesex and
Ocean Counties from the Ford Motor Company Site in Edison Township, Middlesex
County Before the Joint Comm. Meeting of the Assemb. Judiciary Comm. and Assemb. Environment & Solid Waste Comm. (N.J. June 1, 2006) (testimony of Bill
Wolfe, Director, N.J. PEER), available at http://www.peer.org/docs/nj/06_1_6_peer_
testimony.pdf.
For an in-depth report on the mishandling of one site, see Jan Barry et al., Toxic
Legacy, RECORD, Oct. 2-6, 2005, http://www.northjersey.com/toxiclegacy/series.html
(five-part series about former Ford plant in Mahwah). Bruce Springsteen may have
told a tragic tale of the fate of an auto worker who lost his job that begins, “[t]hey
closed down the auto plant in Mahwah late that month,” BRUCE SPRINGSTEEN,
Johnny 99, on NEBRASKA (Columbia Records 1982), but what happened later at that
site is perhaps even more tragic.
145. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Site Remediation & Waste Management Prog., Hot
Issue (Dec. 2004) (on file with author) (stating “[t]he Department never published a
complete list of ranked sites and did not use the list to select sites for public funding”);
see also N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Site Remediation & Waste Management Prog.,
Remedial Priority System Options Paper (Sept. 2004) (on file with author) (“The Department has not ranked sites since approximately 2000. The group that ranked sites
was disbanded so there is no group of people assigned to do this work.”).
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In any event, the state should exercise more oversight over
brownfields sites, not less. It should not allow theoretically unlimited periods of time for brownfields developers to decide whether
to comply with MOAs. The state could have complied with the
GPL by considering some paperwork submissions to be minor, but
deemed technical deficiencies such as a failure to meet the technical specifications of the Oversight Rules to be major and corrected
immediately. The DEP appears to use its discretion to decide
whether a developer made a serious error. This runs the risk of
inadequate and unsupervised cleanups, particularly if the hammer
available to the state—revoking the MOA and moving to enforcement action—is not a credible threat.
IV.

BROWNFIELDS POLICIES

AND

“SMART GROWTH”

The very thing that made the brownfields policy so compelling
when it was first developed in the early 1990s is also the thing
that makes it so vulnerable to criticism. . . . That is, it tries to do
several major things, like . . . bring back these sites and some
kind of community benefit in the form of development. Every
site is unique and rife with opportunities and incentives for political manipulation, corner-cutting and land-use mistakes . .
. .146

Even if a brownfield site is remediated effectively, we should still
ask whether the specific economic development at that site is appropriate. Every community will have a different perspective on
this, so defining appropriate metrics for measuring success presents
a difficult problem. In this Part, I test one claim that proponents of
brownfields revitalization routinely make: that it is an essential
component of “smart growth” strategies.147 “Smart growth” management of land use has the potential to be a “revolution” in land
use law.148 As New Jersey defines it, “[s]mart growth is the term
used to describe well-planned, well-managed growth that adds new
homes and creates new jobs, while preserving open space, farm146. Alexander Lane, From Hazard to Hope?: Redeveloping Old Industrial Sites
Can Be a Boon or a Bust, STAR-LEDGER, May 23, 2004, at 1 (quoting Prof. William
Shutkin of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology).
147. On “smart growth,” see generally Colloquium, A Look at Smart Growth and
Urban Sprawl, 21 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 253 (2002); Patricia E. Salkin, Smart
Growth and Sustainable Development: Threads of a National Land Use Policy, 36
VAL. U. L. REV. 381 (2002); Special Series: New Urbanism and Smart Growth, 29
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1419 (2002).
148. Richard Briffault, Smart Growth and American Land Use Law, 21 ST. LOUIS
U. PUB. L. REV. 253, 253 (2002).
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land, and environmental resources.”149 Space does not permit a
full description of the wide variety of locality-specific options150
that a smart growth strategy would employ to check the increasing
sprawl at suburban and exurban sites.151
While brownfields policies and smart growth gained enormous
traction at roughly the same time in the 1990s, the link between the
two is hardly coincidental.152 There are essentially two aspects of
this. First, urban locations are ideal for the higher-density, pedestrian-friendly, resource-conserving infill developments sought by
smart growth advocates.153 Some major success stories attributed
to brownfields policies are mega-developments bringing stores,
apartments, and parks together in one urban place. This has led at
least one observer to note that VCPs and a generally more
favorable attitude toward infill developments have gone hand in
hand.154 The second part of the “brownfields redevelopment is
149. N.J. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, Office of Smart Growth, http://www.nj.gov/dca/
osg/smart/index.shtml (last visited Mar. 31, 2007).
150. New Jersey’s smart growth “principles” are broad-ranging and include “mixeduse development, walkable town centers and neighborhoods, mass transit accessibility, sustainable economic and social development and preserved green space.” Id.
These could be carried out in a specific context by a whole host of different
techniques.
151. For fuller discussions of “smart growth,” see generally Briffault, supra note
148; Oliver A. Pollard, III, Smart Growth: The Promise, Politics, and Potential Pitfalls
of Emerging Growth Management Strategies, 19 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 247 (2000). For a
counter perspective, see Dwight H. Merriam & Gurdon H. Buck, Smart Growth,
Dumb Takings, 29 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,746 (1999).
152. A good example of a governmental program linking brownfields redevelopment and smart growth in specific communities is the EPA’s “Smart Growth in
Brownfield Communities” initiative, which claims that, “[b]rownfield redevelopment
is an essential component of smart growth, as both seek to return abandoned and
underutilized sites to their fullest potential as community and economic assets.” U.S.
Envtl. Prot. Agency., Smart Growth in Brownfield Communities, http://www.epa.gov/
piedpage/brownfields.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2007).
153. Edward T. Canuel, Supporting Smart Growth Legislation and Audits: An Analysis of U.S. and Canadian Land Planning Theories and Tools, 13 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L.
309, 314 (2005).
Principles of Smart Growth are epitomized by “[c]ompact, transit accessible,
pedestrian-oriented, mixed-use development patterns and land reuse” in a
system which “refocuses a larger share of regional growth within central cities, urbanized areas, inner suburbs and areas that are already served by infrastructure.” Such goals are achieved through measures including “[t]ax
incentives, brownfield redevelopment, elimination of sprawl-enhancing subsidies, [the development of] urban growth boundaries, and transferable development rights.”
Id. (citations omitted).
154. Opp & Hollis, supra note 2, at 8 (“The popularity of VCPs and the increase in
their use over the past 10 years could be attributed in part to a changing attitude
towards infill projects, and the growing realization by city planners, development pro-
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smart growth” linkage is that an infill development might preclude
the need for new development at a suburban location. The
brownfields story assumes that mega-developments would proceed
at greenfields sites if not for incentives to clean up and reuse the
urban sites. As a result, there is an almost one-for-one tradeoff
between a brownfield site saved and a greenfield site protected.
This does not necessarily make growth “smart”; it simply makes it
inevitable.
Reuse of urban space in New Jersey and many other states is
seen almost reflexively as smart growth. Indeed, several New
Jersey programs are conducted within the state’s Office of Smart
Growth (“OSG”).155 Yet when we look at the brownfields programs and the experiences with them, it is not clear that all
brownfields revitalization achieves smart growth. The number of
brownfields sites with useful development potential is a relatively
small subset of the overall number.156 In addition, because a developer of a brownfields parcel with development potential dictates
the terms of the redevelopment strategy on a parcel-by-parcel basis
(in most jurisdictions, brownfields revitalization occurs one site at a
time), there is no guarantee that the growth it promises to provide
is “smart.”
The controversy surrounding the recent plan for the “Atlantic
Yards” area of Brooklyn is perhaps typical.157 The plan envisions a
“large-scale, mixed-use real estate development”158 on a
brownfields site with “a long history of rail, industrial, storage,
fessionals and citizens that reuse projects are both economically practical and important for a high quality of both urban and rural life.”).
155. As the OSG website states, “[t]he New Jersey Brownfields Redevelopment
Task Force assists municipalities and counties in using brownfield redevelopment to
help implement Smart Growth strategies in their plans and initiating an inventory of
marketable brownfield sites for prospective developers with the support of the
Brownfields Redevelopment Interagency Team.” N.J. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, Office
of Smart Growth, Brownfields, http://www.nj.gov/dca/osg/commissions/brownfields/
index.shtml (last visited Mar. 31, 2007).
156. See, e.g., Greenberg, Editorial, supra note 38, at A74.
For every brownfields site that is on 10 or more acres, is well located with
respect to transportation and other infrastructure, and will host a redevelopment of = $100 million, there will be 20 or more that will be on less than 3acre sites located in an unfavorable location that has little obvious appeal to
private investors.
Id.
157. See PlanNYC: New York City Planning Information Portal, http://www.plan
nyc.org/projects (last visited Mar. 31, 2007) [hereinafter PlanNYC] (describing the
project and providing links to organizations both supporting and opposing the
project).
158. Id.
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manufacturing, and commercial uses,”159 “that would consist of a
19,000-seat basketball arena; 4,500 units of housing; over 2.4 million square feet of office and retail space; and six acres of open
space and parking for 3,000 cars.”160 This development has been
fiercely opposed by a number of community groups.161
The mega-development chosen for the urban brownfield site
may pay some attention to smart growth principles, as in the case
of Atlantic Yards. Others, however, might argue that development
is not “smart” if it consists of expensive sports stadiums or highpriced condominiums that defeat neighborhood expectations of affordable housing.162 Local officials’ promises may not necessarily
equate to beneficial outcomes, particularly if community residents
have little say in planning for the remediation and reuse at the site.
The brownfields process, like any urban land use development process, is subject to capture by well-heeled, politically savvy developers and a resulting distrust by local residents.163 As one story on
brownfields projects in New Jersey puts it, “with millions of dollars
in government incentives at stake, and with the design and approval of cleanup remedies subjective and malleable from site to
site, the brownfields process is seen as particularly open to political
manipulation.”164 The story cited “revelations that former Governor Jim Florio and some partners cut a deal for a bargain price on
a publicly owned brownfield in Jersey City,” and the “recent decision to pull Kearny’s Standard Chlorine site—one of the state’s
most polluted sites—from the federal Superfund list so a developer
159. EMPIRE STATE DEV. CORP., ATLANTIC YARDS ARENA AND REDEVELOPMENT
PROJECT at 10-1 (July 2006), available at http://www.empire.state.ny.us/pdf/AtlanticYards/DEIS/10_Hazardous_Materials/10_HazMat.pdf.
160. PlanNYC, supra note 157.
161. See id. (providing links to these groups, including “Brooklyn Against Destructive Development” and “Field of Schemes”).
162. Lane, supra note 146, at 1 (quoting Joe Morris of Jersey City’s Interfaith Community Organization, who observes that, “[i]f you ask 100 people in Jersey City what
should be done with vacant land, 99 of them tell you affordable housing . . . [b]ut
that never gets factored in when a brownfields developer pops in from out of town”);
see also Jennifer Steinhauer, A Cleanup That’s Easier Legislated than Done, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 4, 2005, at 47 (noting the frustration by environmental and neighborhood
advocates about the slow pace of New York’s brownfields program in getting sites for
affordable housing into the program).
163. See, e.g., Greenberg, Editorial, supra note 38, at A74 (noting that “[i]n our
public surveys, it is clear that the public does not necessarily trust its local elected
officials’ and developers’ characterizations of environmental risk, nor their assertions
that the local infrastructure and schools can meet added demands caused by
redevelopment”).
164. Lane, supra note 146, at 1.
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can build warehouses there.”165 This latter development highlights
another point made earlier, that “the brownfields model works
well on modestly contaminated sites, but to use it to address a massively contaminated site is asking the market to do more than it
can.”166
Controversy of this sort does not in and of itself mean that
brownfields development should not proceed. Instead, it simply
tells us that even though the brownfields story assumes development is preferable to inertia, the merits of the proposed real estate
project must be tested in each individual case. There is a means
available to New Jersey to examine whether its policies are having
the desired effect. It has data available that would allow for a
more thorough analysis of whether brownfields developers in New
Jersey are consistently providing promised economic benefits in return for involvement with and remediation of their sites. The state
maintains two extensive databases; a “Known Contaminated Sites”
list that includes (among other data) the number, type, and name
of developers receiving No Further Action letters,167 and one
maintained by the OSG on sites that fit state and local development criteria.168 More work needs to be done to see whether sites
in these two databases are closely correlated. As Professor Dana
has suggested, in-depth analysis of this sort might yield results that
would run contrary to the story of brownfields as an engine of economic redevelopment, and state regulators may be consequently
reluctant to perform this searching analysis.169

165. Id.
166. Id. (quoting Kearny Mayor Alberto Santos).
167. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., NJDEP Known Contaminated Site List for New
Jersey, 2005, http://www.nj.gov/dep/gis/digidownload/metadata/statewide/kcsl.htm
(“The Known Contaminated Sites List for New Jersey 2005 are those sites and
properties within the state where contamination of soil or ground water has been
identified or where there has been, or there is suspected to have been, a discharge of
contamination. This list of Known Contaminated Sites may include sites where
remediation is either currently under way, required but not yet initiated or has been
completed.”).
168. The OSG maintains an extensive collection of digital Geographic Information
System (“GIS”) data, including a number of files which show how sites fit within state
smart growth plans. See N.J. Dep’t of Cmy. Affairs, Office Smart Growth, Maps and
GIS Data, http://www.state.nj.us/dca/osg/resources/maps.shtml (last visited Mar. 31,
2007).
169. Dana, supra note 7, at 95.
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In some states, there is recognition that brownfields remediation
should take place in conjunction with redevelopment.170 In the
BDA initiative, which began in 2002, New Jersey has made a significant attempt to bring together developers and municipalities in a
systematic way to yield effective remediation and economic benefits.171 In the BDA program, the DEP “works with selected communities affected by multiple brownfields to design and implement
remediation and reuse plans for these properties simultaneously.”172 The mechanism for this involves community-based
“steering committees”173 that “propose ‘clusters’ of closely spaced
brownfield sites to DEP for coordinated oversight of the remedial
process.”174 The BDA application requires a steering committee to
submit “a description and explanation of the BDA, a discussion of
the proposed BDA boundaries, current activities and uses within
the BDA, and a clear identification of the brownfields within the
BDA that the Steering Committee intends to address.”175 Current
BDA communities include Camden, Elizabeth, Hillside, Irvington,
Newark, Palmyra, and Trenton,176 and more are in the works.
The contrast with the normal brownfields development process
is striking, as described in a recent article by Evan van Hook, a
former DEP Assistant Commissioner and a driving force behind
the BDA initiative.177 Ordinarily, as noted above, states do not
170. See Bartsch, State of States, supra note 39, at 14 (“More states are channeling
resources to sites with some end use or economic development activity in mind—with
the thinking shifting from cleanup only to a cleanup-and-reuse strategy.”).
171. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Brownfields Development Area Initiative, supra
note 20.
172. Id.
173. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Brief Synopsis of NJDEP’s Brownfields Development Area Initiative, http://www.state.nj.us/dep/srp/brownfields/bda/
bda_synopsis.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2007) [hereinafter N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot.,
Brief Synopsis].
174. See News Release, N.J. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., DEP ISSUES ENFORCEMENT
DIRECTIVES AGAINST THREE COMPANIES TO COMPEL CLEANUP: ACTION SUPPORTS
STATE BROWNFIELD REDEVELOPMENT AREA INITIATIVE (NOV. 18, 2003), HTTP://
WWW.NJ.GOV/DEP/NEWSREL/RELEASES/03_0165.HTM.
175. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Brief Synopsis, supra note 173.
176. See N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Brownfields Development Area Initiative, supra
note 20.
177. See van Hook et al., supra note 19, at 118.
In his 2000 article, van Hook developed a theoretical framework for an areawide brownfield redevelopment program. The framework follows four basic
principles: (1) establish a process to “define and delineate areas affected by
multiple brownfields;” (2) aggregate financial and technical resources and
incentives; (3) develop area-wide remediation and redevelopment plans; and
(4) “provide ongoing, [coordinated, cross-property,] focused support, incentives and assistance for remediation and redevelopment of the brownfields

R
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typically require brownfields developers to demonstrate that their
proposed reuse of the property is consistent with an overall vision
for the community. In the BDA initiative, this perspective
changes, as Van Hook observes that “involvement in shaping the
new uses to which the brownfields will be put . . . is particularly
enhanced.”178 The steering committee’s vision of the proposed reuse is not necessarily the one that will inevitably be adopted:
“While BDA steering committees do not have the ability to dictate
reuse on all properties, however, the BDA Initiative does give the
reuse preferences of the steering committee substantial persuasive
force.”179
Van Hook notes that “the BDA Initiative appears to result in
increased efficiency and effectiveness in the remediation process.”180 One obvious advantage of a multi-site, clustered approach is its ability to address cross-contamination among
brownfields sites at the same location. Ordinarily, the developer of
a site addresses contamination within the legal boundaries of its
own site,181 but in a BDA, by “addressing closely spaced contaminated properties in a concerted effort, the BDA approach helps
ensure that this cross-contamination will not occur, regardless of
the chemical or physical process involved.”182 Van Hook even observes that the “potential for cross-property contamination” should
become a factor in selecting BDAs, to capitalize on the benefits of
remediating multiple sites at once in the same area.183
Finally, there is the potential for significant community involvement. Negotiations regarding redevelopment of brownfields sites
ordinarily take place between the developer and local officials,
which can give developers the upper hand.184 Of course, a savvy
area in accordance with the area-wide plans.” These principles are reflected
in the design of the New Jersey BDA Initiative.
Id.
178. Id. at 140.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 128.
181. Albert I. Telsey & Sally A. Jones, Brownfields Development Area Initiative Is
an Idea in the Making, N.J.L.J., Oct. 20, 2003, at S-10, available at http://
www.westonsolutions.com/pdf_docs/SJonesLNJLawJournal.pdf (noting that “[t]he
owner of a brownfields property usually did not look over the fence to see how he
might be able to tie-in his cleanup with remedial action being undertaken by his
neighbors”).
182. Van Hook et al., supra note 19, at 131.
183. Id.
184. See, e.g., Greenberg, Editorial, supra note 38, at A74 (“For example, to make
enough money to pay the cleanup costs, a housing developer can be expected to ask
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developer may choose to reach out to the affected community,185
but is not normally required to do so.186 By contrast, the BDA
initiative, with its use of the broad-based local steering committee,
explicitly guarantees local involvement. As one recent analysis of
several state area-wide brownfields programs puts it, “[i]n contrast
to site-specific remediation, the area-wide approach of the [New
Jersey] BDA provides a framework that addresses the larger physical, political and social contexts of an affected community.”187
V.

CONCLUSION

Brownfields revitalization is here to stay. It is so popular with a
broad coalition of advocates that states vie for bragging rights
about their programs’ successes.188 At the same time, the
brownfields story’s limitations are also beginning to show. There
are more contaminated sites being addressed in state VCPs, and
perhaps less rapid progress at the average site than the story might
have suggested would take place.189 In this respect, the New Jersey
Grace Period Rule represents incremental backsliding, offering the
potential for longer cleanups and the ability for developers to
evade program rules and responsibilities.
Allowing developers to control their own cleanups also does not
comport with a vision of community-wide real estate development,
such that after a decade of experience, a “consensus is building
among environmental and real estate professionals that the
remediation and reuse of brownfields that were not addressed
through ‘first generation’ brownfield programs will require new
strategies.”190 A second generation of brownfields policies, such as
New Jersey’s BDA initiative, is needed. Second generation
brownfields policies should allow for more area-wide, communityfocused processes, like the BDA initiative, to capitalize more effectively upon the economic promise of the brownfields story. An approach such as the BDA has the potential for considerable
for more units per acre, for permission to put parking on top of areas with residual
contamination, and for deed restrictions on the use of property.”).
185. See generally BARTSCH ET AL., COMING CLEAN, supra note 35.
186. See generally Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3.
187. Kris Wernstedt & Jennifer Hanson, Areawide Brownfield Regeneration
Through Business-Based Land Trusts and Progressive Finance 7 (Lincoln Inst. of
Land Pol’y, Working Paper WP06KW1, 2006), available at http://www.lincolninst.edu/
pubs/dl/1096_Wernstedt_complete_web.pdf.
188. Greenberg, Editorial, supra note 38, at A74.
189. See News Release, Inspector General, supra note 109.
190. Van Hook et al., supra note 19, at 152.
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advantages over parcel-by-parcel brownfields development, and
brings brownfields revitalization closer to the ideal of “smart
growth” than leaving development solely in the hands of individual
developers.191

191. Id. at 114.

